

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday 29 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

(Romania)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. S. F. RAE

Mr. A. E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. HAMID

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL

Mr. A. S. MEHTA

Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLIETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs A. MYRDAL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. E. CORNELL

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J. M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. A. L. RICHARDS
Mr. D. E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I declare open the one hundred and fifteenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Wishing to be free of my duty as the representative of Romania I shall, with the Committee's permission, take the floor first.

In my statement today I shall dwell upon two problems to which we in the Romanian delegation attach a particular importance. I have in mind the two new proposals submitted to the Conference by the delegation of the Soviet Union -- namely, the draft declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) and the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77). It is not, of course, my intention at this stage of our debates to dwell extensively upon the two proposals. Today I wish only to emphasize those aspects which, in our opinion, ought to arrest the attention of the Committee. It goes without saying that we reserve our right to come back to these matters.

With regard to the first proposal, I should like to stress once again that the Romanian Government stands for the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories as well as for the withdrawal of all armed forces stationed on other countries' territories. That is a measure that must be part of the contents of the first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament. It is our conviction that a day will come when all foreign military bases, without exception, will be liquidated; and the sooner it comes the better for the cause of international peace and security. A realistic approach to this issue cannot ignore its most significant elements, which require to be settled most urgently.

It is common knowledge that foreign military bases, in general, represent a great danger to the peace and security of the peoples. But one ought never to ignore the fact that the most serious danger lies in the strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons stationed on those bases. I am referring to the network of military bases, equipped with nuclear weapons and located thousands of kilometres away from the United States, tending to encircle the socialist States like in a ring, subjecting them to the danger of a concentric blow delivered from the immediate vicinity by a potential aggressor. But the danger represented by those bases does not menace only the socialist States. Anyone who confines himself to thinking that the socialist States are the only ones in danger is applying the ostrich policy.

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The existence of those bases not only endangers the security of other peace-loving nations, but at the same time jeopardizes international peace and security in general. Moreover, one cannot overlook the fact that the danger has been growing recently as a consequence of the plans for the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear forces. Everybody knows about the political, diplomatic and military activity carried on at present by the United States Government and by other governments allied to it, in an effort to create a fleet of submarines and surface vessels equipped with Polaris missiles.

That policy of the United States and the other Western nuclear Powers implies the danger of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The creation of NATO multilateral nuclear forces cannot but appear -- as viewed in the perspective of the future development of the issue -- to be an intermediate stage along that path. Countries which today are meant to have, as it is asserted, only "access" to the use of nuclear weapons, tomorrow will become possessors nomine proprio of nuclear weapons and of their strategic delivery vehicles. That is, first of all, the case of the Federal Republic of Germany. I am aware that by recalling the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to nuclear armament I shall stir up certain protests, as happens every time a delegation starts discussing that policy. It appears to me that such protests are unjustified. We have no right to ignore reality; we are in duty bound to face reality as it is. What is the reality?

The representatives of the Western Powers have tried to convince this Conference that the West German Government has undertaken the obligation not to possess or manufacture atomic weapons. Let us take a look at the international commitments of the Federal Republic of Germany. Our Western colleagues have, of course, in mind the statement made by the West German Chancellor on 3 October 1954, according to which:

"The Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory" -- I stress "in its territory" -- "any atomic weapons, chemical or biological weapons."

The key words in that statement are "in its territory". Hence, it follows that the Federal Republic of Germany committed itself not to manufacture nuclear weapons and other types of mass destruction weapons -- but only on its own territory. That commitment does not prevent the West German Government from organizing the

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manufacture of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons on the territories of other States. It does not prevent it from co-operating with other States in order to produce those weapons on a joint basis on territories other than the territory of West Germany, supplying to that end the necessary information, financial means, experts and so on, and, naturally, receiving something in return. It does not prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from obtaining such weapons from other States. It does not prevent Western Germany, once it has become a possessor of nuclear weapons, from employing them against other nations, perhaps using for that purpose bases situated on territories other than the territory of West Germany.

So much for the legal aspect of the matter. As to the facts of the case, they have been recalled by numerous representatives here, and that spares me the trouble of repeating them.

The presence on foreign territories of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons intensifies the risk of war by accident and, equally, increases the danger of a surprise attack. At the same time, the existence of military bases on foreign soil is inconsistent with the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the idea of creating denuclearized zones, although those ideas, which are making ever stronger headway, are becoming more and more pressing and call for speedy implementation.

The Romanian People's Republic is interested in curbing the use of foreign territories for the stationing of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It is concerned about that, as are all peace-loving countries. It feels concerned because it is a country which is part of the community of socialist States, against which the United States military bases on foreign territory are directed. It feels concerned because it is a European socialist country menaced by the NATO nuclear forces. It feels concerned because it is a country situated in the vicinity of the Mediterranean, whence the Polaris-equipped nuclear submarines are menacing it directly.

Consequently, we fully support the measures provided for in the draft declaration submitted by the Soviet delegation. It is our conviction that the implementation of those measures would constitute a first, significant step towards decreasing the nuclear peril, an important element in the process of eliminating all

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foreign military bases. The application of those measures would have a salutary effect upon the international situation in general and would strongly promote the cause of general and complete disarmament, the cause of peace throughout the world. The Romanian delegation wishes to express its desire that the Soviet draft declaration should become the object of constructive discussion in our Committee, discussion which should result in an agreement.

May I now pass to the second Soviet initiative, the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. Here again, I have no intention of going into details. I shall do that in due course. Today I should like to confine myself to certain general considerations.

The proposal regarding the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty is not a new one. It is a proposal that has already been awaiting settlement for a long time. The conclusion of such a pact must not be delayed any longer. Any objection to it is utterly unjustified. When approaching this problem one has to take into account the facts of life, reality itself. It is a fact that those two organizations have today at their disposal the greatest military potential in the world. The biggest Powers in the world, the Soviet Union and the United States, are parties to them, as in fact are all nuclear Powers. It is also a fact that the international situation as a whole, the question whether there will be peace or war, depends to a considerable extent upon the relations prevailing between the States parties to those two organizations.

That is precisely what is envisaged in the second paragraph of the draft pact, which speaks of the resolve of the parties

"to eliminate international tension and to create an atmosphere of confidence in relations between States in order to help forward the consolidation of universal peace and the speediest possible achievement of agreements on the most vital problems of today and particularly on general and complete disarmament" (ENDC/77, p.1)

(The Chairman, Romania)

The draft non-aggression pact submitted to us by the Soviet delegation provides for two broad categories of obligations, obligations in non faciendo and obligations in faciendo.

The obligations in the first category are provided for in article 1 of the draft. In accordance with the provisions of that article the contracting parties solemnly undertake that, in their mutual relations and international relations in general, they will refrain from aggression, the threat or use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. These are provisions which reinforce the stipulation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter that:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

The obligations in the second category, in faciendo, are provided for in articles 2 and 3 of the draft pact. Its article 2 stipulates that:

"All disputes that may arise between one or more States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on the one hand, and one or more States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, on the other hand, shall be resolved by peaceful means only, through negotiations between the parties concerned or by using other means for the pacific settlement of international disputes as provided for by the United Nations Charter." (ibid.)

This is a concrete case of the application of the principle contained in Article 2 (3) of the Charter, which aims at ensuring the maintenance of peaceful relations between the two groups of States. And, indeed, unsettled international issues must not be allowed to subsist or to multiply. Such a policy would be tantamount to stockpiling heaps of inflammable and explosive material. People cannot live on the top of such piles. Outstanding international issues must be settled by peaceful means and, first of all, by negotiations between the parties concerned. As a matter of fact, article 2 of the draft pact stems from the principle of negotiation, from the essential idea that nowadays there are no pending international issues which cannot be settled by peaceful means.

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Another commitment in faciendo is that mentioned in article 3, which stipulates that whenever a situation arises affecting the interests of both sides and likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the signatory parties should hold consultations with a view to taking joint measures in conformity with the United Nations Charter. Here we come upon one of the basic, unanimously acknowledged principles of contemporary international law and of the United Nations Charter -- the principle of international co-operation for the purpose of maintaining and ensuring peace.

The non-aggression pact is not in itself a reflection of ideal international relations. However, its adoption would form a political and legal barrier in the path of those who plan aggression; it would constitute a weapon in the struggle for the amelioration of the situation now prevailing in the world, an important step towards creating international relations from which the danger of war would be banished. It is this idea which lies at the basis of article 4 of the draft pact stating that the non-aggression pact shall remain in force as long as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty are valid.

My purpose in calling the attention of my colleagues to the concrete contents of the provisions of the draft non-aggression pact is to point out the specific advantage and merits of this Soviet initiative. They might be summarized as follows:

1. It is a measure answering a pressing requirement for the implementation of which all necessary conditions have already matured. That is why numerous voices are heard in favour of the non-aggression pact, both within the framework of our Committee and outside.

2. It is a measure easy to implement. I think there is no mistake in saying that no other measure is as simple, as natural and as easy to carry into effect as the conclusion of the non-aggression pact. Problems difficult of settlement, such as those arising with regard to other measures, do not emerge in this particular case. Here the problem of international control cannot be raised as a barrier. Here the fear of a possible imbalance of forces cannot be invoked. The non-aggression pact yields its beneficial effects by the very fact that the signatory parties solemnly undertake the obligation not to start war against each other, without any control. As to the balance of power, it cannot be upset by the conclusion of a

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non-aggression pact because none of the parties is giving up even a single cannon, a single rifle or a single cartridge.

3. The conclusion of the pact would be a potent peace-building factor, a factor of mutual understanding between States. It is obvious that the assumption of obligations such as are provided for in the draft pact would tend to contribute to a large extent to the removal of mistrust and suspicion, to the promotion of a climate propitious for fruitful co-operation between the signatory States. Good relations between the States members of the two organizations mean good relations on the European continent and, ultimately, good relations on a world scale. In fact, here we have a measure which cannot injure the interests of any State. It is in the interests of all.

4. The implementation of the non-aggression pact would promote general and complete disarmament, would facilitate the conclusion of a test ban treaty, would favour the adoption of other collateral measures and would exert a beneficial influence upon our negotiations here.

5. From all these points of view, the conclusion of the NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact would act as a confidence-building factor. Much has been said in our Committee about the necessity to increase confidence. Here and now we are offered a sound opportunity to work in that direction. The proposal submitted to us is in fact an appeal to all to co-operate for the sake of peace.

Those are the reasons which make the Romanian delegation stand resolutely for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between States members of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

Now I should like to make a few comments on the objections raised by our Western colleagues. It has been said that the conclusion of such a pact would not be a disarmament measure. That is true. But neither is the establishment of telephone or wireless communication between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kennedy a disarmament measure. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact would, however, be a measure that could lead to a relaxation in international relations and to the promotion of confidence in relations between States, and it would contribute to the creation of conditions propitious for general and complete disarmament. Our Committee is called upon to examine and adopt measures of such a nature.

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We have been told also that not all the States which would sign a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are members of this Committee. That, too, is true. But if our Committee were to discuss no other problems than those directly affecting only the States members of this Committee our Committee would lack any raison d'être. Our main task is to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Such a treaty would ultimately have to be implemented by all the States of the world, though only eighteen States are members of this Committee. Does a nuclear weapon test ban affect only the States members of the Committee? Is it not obvious that no matter where the explosions take place their effects are detrimental to all States the world over?

It has been asserted also that the conclusion of such a pact would be useless because the principles of contemporary international law, as well as the United Nations Charter, prohibit aggression. That objection does not stand up to analysis either. To proclaim an acknowledged principle is not a useless exercise. It strengthens the principle in question and implants it still more deeply in the legal conscience of the peoples; it summons up world public opinion to its defence; and it mobilizes the peoples for the fight against those who might try to disregard it. It is current governmental practice. That is precisely why there are numerous international treaties which reiterate expressis verbis the principles proclaimed in the Charter, and why there are equally countless resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in which principles of the Charter are restated and confirmed.

Incidentally, I must confess that I find it rather surprising to hear contentions by the Western representatives here concerning the alleged uselessness of a non-aggression pact. As far as I know, persons of the highest consequence in the Western countries are expressing quite a different view. I shall confine myself to quoting a single example, and it is from Mr. Kennedy, the President of the United States, who said on 25 November 1961:

"I think it would be helpful if NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a commitment to live in peace with each other."

(The Chairman, Romania)

Our Western colleagues have repeatedly told us of the "defensive" character of NATO. It is not my intention to state once more the Romanian delegation's view on that issue. I would only remark that if NATO were a defensive organization its members ought to sign with both hands the non-aggression pact offered to them. A non-aggression pact is in the last analysis a pact for peace. Here in this Committee we are called upon to work for peace. There is no obstacle, no difficulty of such a nature as to justify the resistance of the Western Powers to that measure, which is intended to promote peace between the States members of NATO and the signatories to the Warsaw Pact.

May I express the hope that the members of this Committee will thoroughly discuss the two documents submitted by the Soviet delegation. From such a discussion the truth would emerge, more clearly still, that by the adoption of the proposed measures there would be nothing to be lost and everything to be gained. The idea of peace and international co-operation -- and that idea alone -- would be served.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): My delegation would like to discuss today the question of reduction of the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. I am sure that most members of the Committee will have felt that there was in that field an area of potential agreement that was indeed promising. In both the United States (ENDC/30) and Soviet disarmament plans (ENDC/2/Rev 1) there are three measures in that area that are quite similar. They relate to the establishment of direct and more secure communications, the exchange of military missions and advance notification of major military movements.

In the past there have been indications that the Soviet Union recognized that it would be valuable to put into effect measures in this area at an early date. In his statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 6 November last year Mr. Zorin noted the fact -- which the United States welcomes -- that the Soviet Union had added to its disarmament plan measures to reduce the risk of accidental war. Mr. Zorin said:

"It will be clear to all, in the light of recent international events, that all this may be of the utmost importance for the maintenance of peace during disarmament." (A/C.1/PV.1267, p.17)

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The United States regarded that as a hopeful sign.

For the purpose of affording delegations and their Governments an opportunity to study our thinking on this subject in greater detail during the year-end recess, the United States delegation on 12 December last, submitted its "Working paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication" (ENDC/70). It was our hope that after the recess we would be able to move forward in negotiation of specific arrangements for at least certain measures in that area. Unfortunately, the earlier hopes of the Conference in that connexion have not yet been fulfilled. At our meeting on 20 March Mr. Tsarapkin referred to the three risk of war measures that are common to both plans, and said:

"Obviously measures of that kind would acquire definite significance only if carried out within the framework of general and complete disarmament. Taken by themselves, in isolation from disarmament measures, they would not only be useless but, what is more they could be turned against the security interests of particular States." (ENDC/PV.111, p.29)

I wish to say to Mr. Tsarapkin that the United States Government does not believe that that is a correct assessment of the measures which we have suggested to reduce the risk of war. At the same time I wish to assure the Soviet delegation that the United States Government is not interested in leading the Soviet Union to enter into any agreement in this field that the Soviet Union is not convinced will lessen risks and increase confidence, for that would be directly contrary to the purpose of our efforts. We hope to be able, by removing any misconceptions that may exist in the minds of the Soviet delegation and through further discussion in this Committee and at informal meetings, to convince the Soviet Union of the value of measures in this field as initial steps. It is, then, in that spirit that I should like to set forth today some thoughts for consideration by this Committee and, if I may say so, for consideration particularly by the Soviet delegation.

Every delegation here has spoken of the dangerous condition that has resulted from the growth of modern armaments and of the paradox that exists of less and less security as the arms race goes on. The purpose of this Conference is to stop that arms race and to achieve through general and complete disarmament measures the

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removal of the weapon systems which today pose a threat to the survival of civilization. At the same time, however, we all know that the problem of working out arrangements for a balanced and verified programme to remove the present confrontation of weapons is complicated and will take time.

What has all this to do with the question of measures to reduce the risk of war? Simply stated, it is that we must all recognize that, while the dangers may be reduced by the political and psychological effects of some collateral measures of disarmament or of steps in the disarmament process itself, they will continue to exist during some collateral measures that might be agreed upon; they will continue to exist during disarmament and during the negotiation of all of those measures. We cannot wave a magic wand and suspend those dangers while our negotiations proceed and while disarmament takes place. It is that fact that sets apart the type of measures we have suggested to reduce the risk of war. It is that fact that imposes an obligation of great responsibility upon the principal military Powers to do what can be done easily and quickly to lessen the possibility of unintended war. Because there are some things that can be done quickly and easily and do not involve questions of "balance" or "adequate verification", the Powers that are in large measure responsible for the destiny of the world should act responsibly.

The United States would hope that in time a wide range of measures to reduce the risk of unintended war might be agreed upon. Various possible areas of agreement are discussed in the working paper submitted by the United States delegation (ENDC/70). It is of course true that for the moment there are only three measures which are common to both disarmament plans and it is those measures which offer hope for earlier agreement. We would hope that all of those measures could be agreed to at an early date, for they tend to reinforce each other's effectiveness. Nevertheless we for our part are prepared to undertake them separately. I should like at this time to say a few words about each of them.

Mr. Tsarapkin, in his statement at our meeting on 20 March, took certain exceptions to the United States proposal for advance notification of major military movements (ENDC/FV.111, p.29), and I might, therefore, begin with some comment on that measure. The United States views it as a measure which would provide a degree

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of reassurance by permitting States to have the opportunity for calm appraisal of military activities which might give rise to misinterpretation as threatening the imminent outbreak of hostilities. In a sense that would be an extension and improvement of the practice of certain States that even today give a certain amount of advance information of military movements. As the United States has indicated in its working paper, the criteria for determining the military activities of interest are to a certain extent subjective and are dependent upon the general situation in which a particular activity might occur, the States and the areas involved, and the level of tension at any particular time. Thus substantial reliance may of necessity have to be placed upon the judgement of the State initiating the activity.

This point -- the reliance on the judgement of what in this connexion we might call the "host country", to use a familiar phrase -- is an important concept which runs throughout the three measures I shall discuss today. It may be that the true significance of that concept has not been fully recognized so far in this Committee. All three measures are designed primarily not to impose obligations on a "host country" but to afford it opportunities to utilize the arrangement for purposes of clarification and reassurance.

It is of course true that if arrangements were to be effective certain practical understandings would have to be agreed upon. That is particularly true in the case of advance notification of major military movements, where the parties would wish to know not merely what information could be expected on a continuing basis but also the type of information that would not be reported regularly. The types of activities which the United States suggests be discussed for possible inclusion in such an agreement are set forth in the United States working paper, and I shall not go into them in detail today. I do want to say, however, that they are presented for purposes of discussion, and we should be happy to have comments by the Soviet delegation or other delegations regarding our suggestions. I should add that we believe States should be free to provide advance notification in any additional cases not covered by the agreement if that were deemed by them to be warranted. The United States has made additional suggestions in its working paper with respect to the procedures that might be followed in giving advance notification.

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The point I wish to emphasize at this time, however, does not concern the specifics of the proposal; those can be worked out by experts and need not take the time of this Committee. The point I wish to emphasize is the purpose of the measure. The purpose is not to establish arrangements which would enable one State to acquire from another State information which the latter would regard as sensitive; the purpose is to afford to States a mechanism that would facilitate the transmission of agreed types of information which would give reassurance and lessen the danger of unintended war.

As the United States has indicated in its working paper, the risk of unintended war does not involve merely the question of the unexpected character of certain military activities. There are broader factors which are important in this connexion. States may miscalculate the possible response of another State, or they may misinterpret the true character of some military activity. States will proceed not only on the basis of what facts are available but also in the light of their own past experience, assessment of over-all military relationships and the military and political evaluations of the intentions of the other side. The over-all interpretations of those broader factors are more likely to be accurate if they are based on extensive rather than narrow contacts. The United States believes that the exchange of military missions is a possible approach to that aspect of the problem, for direct contacts between military establishments of many States are at present relatively narrow. The missions would also be available to assist the host State, to the extent that the host State desired, in clarifying ambiguous situations where lack of authentic information might prove disquieting.

Here again the Committee will observe the theme that reappears throughout the three measures I am discussing today: the arrangement would be for the purpose of use by the host State to the extent that the host State wished to use it. I would ask members of this Committee to look at the proposed functions of the military missions as set forth on pages 9 and 10 of the United States working paper (ENDC/70). They will see that in every case the discretion regarding use of the mission rests with the host country. In a very real sense the mission exists primarily to serve the host country. As we have indicated, in our view the missions would be very small in terms of personnel, although they should be headed by an officer of high rank. It goes without saying, of course, that the members of the mission would be fully accredited and would have such privileges and immunities as might be agreed.

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I should like to turn now to the third measure which is common to the Soviet and the United States disarmament plans -- the establishment of more direct and secure communications. There are, of course, extensive technical means of communication in existence today. However, we are faced with the implications arising from the existence of modern weapons systems, the speed of which I need not discuss, for it has been referred to many times by members of this Committee. There is therefore room to question whether the arrangements for communication that exist between major States today are sufficiently rapid and sufficiently reliable to enable them to serve the essential task of communication in a period of military emergency or crisis -- the transmission of information in time.

The people of the world can hardly be expected to believe that the governments which share the major burden of responsibility in this particular matter have met their responsibilities when, after the demonstration of need for improved communication afforded by recent events, those governments have failed to take the relatively simple steps required to assure continuous reliable communication. For its part the United States Government is prepared to act quickly to assure that that need is met. I might also add that awareness of the availability of direct and secure communication would itself prove reassuring both to peoples and governments concerning the intentions of other governments.

The United States does not believe it would be necessary or desirable to specify in advance all types of situations in which a special communications link might be used. We do believe, however, that there should be a common understanding concerning the general purposes and the broad circumstances under which use of such a link would be most helpful. We believe that as a general matter such a link should be reserved for emergency use; for instance, for communications concerning a sudden change in the military situation or the emergence of a military crisis which might appear to threaten the security of the States involved where such developments were taking place so fast as to preclude the use of normal consultative procedures. We do not believe the use of the link should be diffused through use for other matters.

With respect to the technical arrangements, the primary criteria should be that the link be continuously effective and as rapid as practical. As we have indicated, we believe the use of teletype systems might, on balance, be the most desirable method.

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A line reserved for teletype messages could be used, of course, also for voice communications if that proved desirable.

The simplest arrangement and also the most effective would be for each State to be responsible for arrangements within its own territory. Thus each State would determine the terminal, or originating, point of the link. Each would also be responsible for its own arrangements with respect to assuring effective internal distribution of messages to appropriate officials. In the case of the United States we have indicated that it might be practical for the link at our end of the circuit to be in the National Command Center, which maintains continuing contact with the principal officials, including the President, who would be concerned with crisis situations. The route for connecting the two end points would have to be agreed, of course, but recent progress in connexion with agreements concerning the transmission of weather data would indicate that that should prove to be a very small problem indeed. Similarly simple to resolve should be arrangements for continuous manning of the link and, of course, for acting on messages which might be received.

Once again I would point out that the same theme recurs in this proposal as occurred in the other two we have discussed, for the proposal concerns an arrangement which would be for such mutual benefit as the parties desired. Indeed, in this arrangement no exchange of personnel would be involved, though I should point out that if this arrangement were combined with the exchanges of military missions, such missions would be available for consultation, should that prove desirable, in connexion with matters that might require the use of the communication link. As we have also indicated previously, while the arrangements should be undertaken directly between the States concerned, the States might at their discretion wish to notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the circumstances that warranted the use of the communication link.

The United States delegation would like to hear the views of the Soviet delegation and of other delegations on these proposals. We recognize that genuine negotiation in this area must of necessity take place primarily among those States possessing the most modern weapons. We also recognize that, perhaps particularly in this area, negotiations would be most fruitful if carried on, at least initially, in informal discussions. We hope that, following exchanges of views in this Committee and further informal discussion, an informal technical working group or groups could be established to explore the modalities of these arrangements. Such working groups of experts could forward their reports to this Conference and to

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

the governments concerned. We could then have political and legal experts draft documents setting forth precise arrangements and those documents could be referred quickly to governments for approval.

We believe all the foregoing steps could be accomplished in a short period of time. Moreover, they need not compete in this Committee with the discussion of other proposals. The major military Powers have a heavy responsibility to their own peoples and to other nations to take those relatively simple steps that would reduce the danger of unintended war. To do less, when so little is required, would be incompatible with the exercise of the responsibility which rests upon the major military Powers.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In accordance with the decision we have adopted the Eighteen Nation Committee is now taking up the consideration of measures designed to reduce international tension and to create favourable conditions for the solution of the main problem of the present day, the problem of general and complete disarmament. A number of such proposals have been submitted to the Committee for consideration. We must now examine carefully which of those proposals really answers the purpose of improving the international situation and reducing the danger of a military conflict between the nuclear Powers. As a result of our discussion there should be agreement on concrete measures, the implementation of which is so insistently called for by the international situation. In order to find the right and most effective solution of this problem, in order to select adequate measures, we must, of course, have a proper understanding of the situation which urgently demands the adoption of such measures. For this reason we shall take the liberty of making a brief review of the situation.

In the general debate at the beginning of the present stage of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the participants in the negotiations expressed serious concern at the dangerous direction in which events in the world are developing. Whereas world public opinion and the General Assembly of the United Nations demand year after year a cessation of the armaments race and a solution of the disarmament problem actually the opposite is taking place. The machinery of military preparations is working with ever greater speed, armed forces are

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increasing, arsenals of destructive weapons are continually growing and military budgets are swelling to a colossal size. We see a picture developing in which the forces controlling the military blocs of the West are pressing all the buttons in order to accelerate still further the speed of military preparations and to extend their scope. The calculations on which the leaders of the United States and other Western Powers base themselves in planning their policies can be seen from the fact that in their military staffs and in the NATO Council they are drawing up five-year, seven-year and even longer armament and rearmament plans. The Mexican representative, Mr. Padilla Nervo, was quite right when he pointedly noted the bitter irony of the present situation, in which, as he said, some rearmament plans:

"extend beyond the period considered necessary to effect general and complete disarmament in all its stages." (ENDC/PV.109, p.12)

The military and political leaders of the Western blocs find it possible to work out military plans for many years ahead. But here, in the Committee, in the negotiations on disarmament the Western delegations are unable to submit disarmament plans which would be in keeping with the aims of disarmament and would put an end to competition in the field of nuclear weapons and to their dissemination.

International events are now developing in such a way that the threat of nuclear war is increasing and becoming more serious every day. Following the conclusion of the United Kingdom-United States agreement at Nassau on the creation of an atomic submarine fleet armed with nuclear missiles, new plans with different names but subordinated to a single aim, namely that of widening the circle of States armed with nuclear weapons, have made their appearance and are being intensively discussed in various organs of NATO. At Nassau, submarines with nuclear weapons were mentioned. Then we heard about a NATO surface fleet with nuclear missiles on board. Now we have learned of plans to locate missiles with nuclear warheads on the territory of Western Germany. Each of these steps means the emergence of more and more potential hotbeds of nuclear war. More and more hands are stretching out to the button which can set in motion the machinery of a nuclear war. Public opinion is being lulled with assurances that a nuclear missile war could start only if all these hands pressed the button at the same time. But all these assurances can only give rise to unwarranted hopes and dangerous illusions. They cannot, of course, prevent a nuclear war.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

A particular danger is created by the fact that all the NATO nuclear armament plans, whether they concern a multi-national or multilateral nuclear force, have one and the same aim. Their aim is to work out in the present circumstances (when the Federal Republic of Germany has no nuclear weapons of its own) the most effective way to give Western Germany access to these weapons of mass destruction. We have already pointed out this danger and emphasize it once more not because we fear the militarists of Western Germany. No, the Soviet Union possesses everything necessary in order to crush any aggressor. If the West German revanchists start a war, they will not survive even a day; within the first few hours of war everything there will literally be burned up; everything will be reduced to dust by thermonuclear explosions. If we warn with so much alarm against giving Western Germany access to nuclear weapons, it is because we are concerned for the fate of the world. There can be no doubt that if the present-day West German revanchists, the aftermath of Hitler, are in any way given access to nuclear weapons, they will not hesitate to unleash a nuclear missile war in order to achieve their aggressive aims. We know that these bitter words of truth are not to the liking of the representatives of the United States and of other Western Powers. Whenever we point out the danger which threatens the world as a result of the intensive military preparations of the Western Powers and their feverish efforts to equip the West German Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, the representatives of the United States and its allies react immediately to our warnings with irritation. They immediately defend the West German revanchists -- their foes of yesterday, their allies of today -- and try to dress the wolf in sheep's clothing. But this dangerous patronage of the Bonn revanchists by the Western Powers will not stop our struggle to prevent the growth of the threat of war, particularly in connexion with the growth of militarism in Western Germany. We have not forgotten that German militarism, in the wars unleashed by it, caused enormous harm to many peoples, especially the peoples of Europe. Many tens of millions of people perished in the very flower of youth. It is essential to take all possible measures to prevent the outbreak of another war, which, if it were to break out, would inevitably be a nuclear missile war with all its monstrous and catastrophic consequences to mankind. Unfortunately, we are now witnessing a fatal repetition of the ominous mistakes of the past.

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Now, almost two decades after the end of the Second World War, those same forces which unleashed that war again occupy a leading position in Western Germany and are stealthily striving to dominate in the military alliance of the Western Powers -- NATO. Moreover, just as in the days of Munich, on the eve of the Second World War, the United States, the United Kingdom and France are giving wide support to the German revanchist circles and are contributing to the re-militarisation of Western Germany and the equipping of its armed forces with nuclear weapons. The peoples of Europe who two decades ago were subjected to treacherous aggression by Hitlerite Germany do not overlook the fact that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force is meeting with ardent support, above all, in West German military circles, which do not hide their enthusiasm in this connexion. The Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Von Hassel, openly boasts that it was he who put forward the idea of creating a NATO multilateral nuclear surface fleet and that Western Germany would like to start work on the creation of such a fleet "as soon as possible."

Already at the present time, while the question of creating a NATO nuclear fleet is still at the stage of negotiation, Mr. Von Hassel is talking about the claim of Western Germany to be in command of NATO vessels equipped with nuclear weapons. He says:

"I see no reason why a German captain could not be chosen."

(New York Herald Tribune, 11 March 1963, p.3)

The Bonn militarists have no doubt that they will occupy key positions in the NATO nuclear fleet. They are so convinced of this that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to assume 40 per cent of the vast expenditure involved in financing the construction of this fleet, demanding in exchange, however, freedom of action for each participant in the multilateral nuclear force with regard to the military use of this force. As you see, the leading circles in West Germany are clearly trying to gain control over the decision on the use of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, according to Mr. Von Hassel's statement, the Federal Republic of Germany has already secured from the United States a decision on the question of equipping the West German Bundeswehr with tactical atomic weapons called "Davy Crockett". Now the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany are putting forward a demand for the location in West Germany of medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads, that is strategic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. In particular, such a demand was put forward recently by Chancellor Adenauer.

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The Franco-West German Treaty on military co-operation, concluded on 22 January 1963 in Paris, is also a pointer to the strengthening of the position of the West German militarists in NATO. That treaty stipulates the close military and political alliance of France and Western Germany, which serves the purpose of increasing international tension and undermining peace and the security of the peoples, above all in Europe. That treaty opens up to the West German revanchists new opportunities for their military and political plans, the implementation of which would only be possible through the unleashing of a new war in Europe. The clauses of that treaty provide for the joint elaboration of armament plans, the co-ordination of military research activities, and so on. All that enables the Bundeswehr to exercise a decisive influence on the acceleration of the armaments race in order to carry out their aggressive revanchist plans.

The creation of foreign military bases on the territory of other States and the location of nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at those bases increase international tension and still further strain the relations between States, making even greater the threat of a nuclear missile war.

Such is the present international situation, with its dangers of a nuclear missile war. It is impossible to tolerate that events should be allowed to develop in the same dangerous direction in the future. It is essential to halt this senseless race towards the precipice of war. It is essential to agree as quickly as possible on effective measures which would, if not completely remove, at least considerably reduce the threat of a nuclear missile war. I shall now deal with these measures.

Taking into account the danger inherent in the existing situation, the Soviet Government has submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) and a draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty (ENDC/77).

The Soviet delegation has already explained in general the meaning and purpose of such measures as renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Why has the Soviet Government raised the question of the necessity of removing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons from foreign territories as quickly as possible?

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First, because these delivery vehicles are intended for delivering a nuclear blow at peace-loving States and in this sense they are the most aggressive components of the military machinery. Whereas to some extent one can say that, for instance, anti-aircraft defence weapons, fighters and a number of other types of conventional armaments are not, in modern warfare, the means by which an aggressor-country would be able to deliver a serious blow at another State, on the other hand, strategic nuclear delivery vehicles can be used for such a blow.

Secondly, the presence of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on foreign territory cannot fail to create an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion in international relations, an atmosphere in which war may be sparked off at any minute. In fact, can one really speak of establishing normal relations between States when one of them has moved its most modern means of attack far beyond its own boundaries, aiming them at other States?

Thirdly, the removal of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from foreign territory would reduce the risk of local or accidental conflicts turning into a war with the use of nuclear weapons. After all, it is clear to everyone that the presence of these weapons on foreign territory creates a situation in which any local conflict could quickly develop into a general thermonuclear war. States which make their territory available for the stationing of foreign strategic weapons are placing themselves in the front-line of fire, under a retaliatory nuclear strike.

Finally and fourthly, the presence of nuclear missiles on foreign territory leads to the dissemination of these weapons and in fact gives access to such weapons to countries not yet possessing them.

Those are, in a concise form, the considerations by which the Soviet Government was guided when it proposed, as one of the priority measures, the adoption of the Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The implementation of the provisions of the Declaration would undoubtedly reduce tension in international relations, would to a considerable extent dispel the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, and would help forward the adoption and implementation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. All those who genuinely desire to bring about a normal situation in the world, a situation cleansed of the threat of war, cannot

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fail to support this Soviet proposal. Only those who are fostering plans for war and aggression can oppose the implementation of the measures we have proposed.

We note with satisfaction the great interest in our proposal which is being shown throughout the world. Here in the Committee, the representatives of a number of States have expressed themselves in favour of adopting the draft Declaration proposed by the Soviet Union. At the same time we have heard certain objections on the part of the Western delegations. In particular, Mr. Godber and Mr. Cavalletti have asserted that the geographical situation compels the Western countries to create a network of bases on foreign territories and that if the Soviet Declaration were adopted the so-called balance of forces would be seriously disturbed in favour of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

That, of course, is not a serious argument. We shall not enter into a discussion on what a "balance of forces" is. We consider it necessary only to emphasize that the Soviet Union does not at all propose in its draft Declaration to reduce or to eliminate the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the possession of either side. Those nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which are at present in the possession of States would still remain in their possession and therefore any calculations or references to a disturbance of the "balance of forces" are altogether out of place.

Moreover, attempts to link the so-called "balance of forces" with geography are quite absurd, since the range of modern intercontinental missiles does not depend on geography. How can geography come into the question, if the range of modern intercontinental missiles exceeds 15,000 kilometres and the range of global missiles, in the conditions of the world, is practically limitless? In such circumstances, the location of strategic delivery vehicles on the territory of other States can be explained only by plans to involve the peoples of other countries in a nuclear missile war.

Our delegation has quoted a statement by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, who in fact admitted that on the territory proper of the United States there are quite sufficient nuclear weapon delivery vehicles for its own needs. This was confirmed by President Kennedy quite recently. At his press conference of 22 March, referring to the creation of a NATO multilateral and multi-national force, he said that this force had no substantial significance for the security of the United States. If that is so, one may well ask what need

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is there for atomic submarines armed with Polaris missiles in foreign ports and foreign waters? What need is there for nuclear strike aircraft carriers in foreign ports and foreign waters? Why is it necessary to station strategic air forces armed with nuclear weapons in Europe? Apparently, only in order to draw other peoples into the vortex of a nuclear war, in the interests of the implementation of the aggressive plans of NATO.

Sometimes we hear as arguments in favour of the stationing of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in some particular States, references to the alleged need to defend those countries. But those arguments are absurd from every point of view. Can it be seriously maintained, for instance, that the Holy Loch base in Scotland or the fifteen Jupiter missiles in Italy ensure the security of those countries? Of course not. On the contrary, the stationing of United States strategic delivery vehicles equipped with nuclear warheads on the territory of the United Kingdom and Italy, as well as on the territories of other States, exposes those countries to the gloomiest of all the dangers of our atomic era -- the danger of being drawn into a thermonuclear war merely because of the fact that foreign nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are stationed on their territories.

All this is being done against the interests of the peoples of those countries who, in any case, have no desire to burn in a thermonuclear conflagration for the sake of solidarity with allies who have unleashed such a war.

It is no mere accident, therefore, that public opinion in the countries on whose territories these means of delivery with nuclear warheads are stationed should resolutely demand that they be removed.

The harm and danger of bases on foreign territories with the means of delivery of nuclear weapons lies also in the fact that they are a powerful means of political influence and even of interference in the internal life of a country, not to mention its dependence in regard to foreign policy. That is particularly true in regard to bases in African and Asian countries, countries which are striving to strengthen their national independence. The presence of foreign nuclear missile bases on the territories of such States jeopardises the independence and the very existence of the young Asian and African countries. That aspect of the United States nuclear missile bases was frankly pointed out by the well-known United States military commentator, Hanson Baldwin. Evaluating the significance of United States bases

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on foreign territories, he stressed in "The New York Times" of 7 November 1962:

"Overseas bases and facilities are far more important as a political part of the general United States deterrent ... than as a part of the strategic nuclear deterrent".

And he went on to say:

"In this context they are virtually indispensable".

It would be difficult to speak with greater clarity of the significance to the United States of its bases on foreign territories.

The representatives of the Western Powers can, of course, assert that the States on whose territories the bases are located retain the right to demand their liquidation whenever they wish to do so. Statements of that kind merely serve as a verbal screen and no one takes such explanations seriously, because in practice it is not so easy to get rid of foreign bases imposed through the use of financial, economic and other means of inducement or pressure and corroborated by treaties. Let us take the example of Cuba on whose territory is the United States military base of Guantanamo, the liquidation of which is demanded by the Government of Cuba. The situation in this case is that the United States has broken off relations with Cuba, is waging an economic war against it and is openly equipping bands of counter-revolutionaries who carry out brigandish raids on Cuba and then find shelter either directly in the United States or on territories under its protection. Nevertheless, the United States retains its military base in Cuba, and would resist by force of arms its liquidation.

The implementation of the provisions of the Soviet Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear arms would help all countries, on which foreign bases have been imposed, to get rid of them. That would be a contribution to the peaceful development of those countries and to the consolidation of their independence.

The Western Powers are trying to make out that they are now liquidating some of their nuclear missile bases -- in the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey. If it were a matter of the liquidation of bases, we would welcome such a step as a definite contribution to the cause of peace, whatever the reasons for it may have been. The situation, however, is quite different. The bases of strategic

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aircraft with nuclear weapons are being retained on the territories of those countries. Furthermore, B-47 bombers, as reported in the press, are being replaced by more modern B-52 bombers with a range of 16,000 kilometres and instead of land bases for missiles, bases for nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles are being created. It is well known that such a base exists at present in the United Kingdom.

According to the statements of official United States spokesmen, a squadron of nuclear submarines is to be stationed in the Mediterranean in the spring of this year. The question of basing these submarines in Spain and Italy is under discussion. By what needs of security or defence can the stationing of nuclear submarines in the Mediterranean be justified? How can the transfer of United States nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles to an area immediately adjacent to the shores of socialist countries be reconciled with statements about the desirability of easing international tension? Of course, it is impossible. These measures reveal the desire of the United States to establish its domination over the whole of the Mediterranean area.

There is a false ring about the arguments put forward by Mr. Godber and Mr. Cavalletti to the effect that the plans of the United States and NATO to send nuclear submarines with nuclear missiles to the Mediterranean and to station in foreign ports and waters United States ships with nuclear missiles are a normal process of modernizing the defence system of the West. What defence can there be any question of, when the intention is to move the means for a nuclear attack as close as possible to the boundaries of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States? In this connexion it is appropriate to recall a statement by the President of the United States who pointed out in his speech of 22 October 1962:

"We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute a maximum peril.

"Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantial increased possibility of their use or sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace."

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In that statement the United States President correctly assessed the situation. However, it is not enough to realize the great danger to the cause of peace inherent in the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territory. It is necessary to draw practical conclusions from this for oneself. Accordingly it is necessary to take such steps as would eliminate the danger about which the President of the United States spoke so clearly on 22 October 1962.

The Soviet Union has submitted its draft Declaration precisely in order to stop the dangerous trend of events in international life in connexion with the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories. The adoption of this Soviet proposal would have a most positive influence on the development of the present international situation and would help towards the settlement of controversial international issues as well as towards the solution of the problem of disarmament.

We express the hope that all members of the Committee will consider this Soviet proposal in the most serious manner and will endeavour to bring about its implementation.

The same desire to improve the international situation and to reduce the threat of a nuclear missile war underlies the Soviet Union's proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

The significance of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries is easy to understand if one faces the facts which determine the conditions of existence of the modern world. Two powerful groups of States possessing the largest armed forces and equipped with the most modern types of weapons are facing each other. A military conflict between these two groups would inevitably mean universal nuclear war. The greater the tension in the relations between these two groups, the more dangerous is the situation in the world and the greater the likelihood of war breaking out. Therefore any measure that would make it possible to ease the tension in the relations between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries would be a step towards consolidating peace, and foremost amongst such measures stands, undoubtedly, a non-aggression pact between these countries.

The need to normalize relations between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries is realized by literally everyone. It is also realized by the leaders of

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the States of the Western world. It was no mere accident that in the tense days of the Caribbean crisis, when the world was on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe, one of the first thoughts that came into the minds of statesmen was the need for an immediate settlement of the relations between the two military and political groups — NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

Everyone realizes that such a settlement is as necessary to the peoples as air.

Can such a settlement be achieved? Yes, we consider that it is possible, and we propose a simple, easily implemented and clear solution, namely, to assume a solemn obligation not to attack each other and to lay this obligation down in an international agreement.

The Soviet delegation has explained in a general way in the Committee the draft non-aggression pact which it proposes. Whatever article, whatever provision of this document we may take, every one of them is imbued with concern for peace; every one of them has equal consequences for the parties to the treaty; and these consequences are beneficial: the security of the countries parties to the treaty would become permanent and their mutual relations would become much better than they are at present.

Our draft non-aggression pact provides that all the parties to it should assume the solemn obligation to refrain from aggression. How can that be unacceptable, how can that be bad for the peoples and for the cause of peace?

Our draft pact proposes that the future parties to it should solemnly undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, both against each other and in their international relations in general. Is there anything in that proposal which some State would be unable to accept? After all, as far as we know, the member States of NATO and those of the Warsaw Treaty are also member States of the United Nations and have assumed similar obligations under its Charter. It has been said that this would be a repetition of the obligations under the United Nations Charter, but that is an argument which only those can use who do not see or who do not wish to see the real situation in the world, the fact that it is precisely on these two groups that the fate of the world, the fate of all nations depends. If the NATO countries and

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the Warsaw Treaty countries solemnly reaffirm before the world their obligation not to resort to force or to the threat of force, this could not fail to play a positive role and give people even greater assurance that peace would be preserved. The need for such a reaffirmation of the obligation not to resort to force or the threat of force is all the more obvious since the military potential of the opposing groups is growing day by day and becoming more and more fantastic, while the relations between them are becoming more and more tense.

Our draft pact further provides that all disputes that may arise between States parties to the treaty shall be resolved by peaceful means only, through negotiations between the parties concerned and by using other means for the pacific settlement of international disputes as provided for by the United Nations Charter. There is nothing unacceptable in this provision either, but the political effect of such an agreement would be very positive, very fruitful -- it would create additional possibilities for the peaceful settlement of disputes. We all remember quite well how at the time of the Caribbean crisis measures were taken on both sides to set on a war footing the opposing armed forces -- the forces of NATO, on the one hand, and the forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries, on the other. An agreement between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries to settle contentious issues exclusively by peaceful means would mean that in the future, should any frictions arise, the thoughts of the statesmen responsible for the destinies of those countries will be directed not towards arms but towards negotiations, towards the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. A non-aggression pact would bind them to do so.

Finally, our draft non-aggression pact provides that should a situation arise affecting the interests of the sides and likely to endanger peace and security, the parties to the pact would consult each other with a view to taking and implementing such joint measures as may, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, be considered appropriate for the peaceful settlement of such situations.

An outstanding illustration of the great value to the cause of peace of such a provision can be seen in what occurred during the recent international crisis. We know that situations of various kinds, at times tense and at times even dangerous, may also arise in the future. The Caribbean crisis showed the vital importance to

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the cause of peace of direct consultations between the States members of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. For this reason the adoption of our proposal would open up new and, moreover, reliable and effective channels for the settlement of any dangerous situation with due regard for the interests of all the parties concerned.

If we were to express the main idea of our proposal in a simple form, the parties would reaffirm before the whole world that they harbour no aggressive intentions against any other party and that they are resolved to use all peaceful means in order to avoid an armed conflict. The side which refused to assume such an obligation would inevitably appear before the whole world as the side concealing aggressive designs and unwilling to take the path of the peaceful settlement of disputes, as the side prepared to take up arms in order to achieve its aims.

We have heard a good many assurances that the NATO alliance is not an aggressive, but an exclusively defensive alliance. If that is so, then prove the truth and validity of your assurances. Declare before the whole world that you do not intend to attack the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. Conclude a non-aggression pact. We are waiting for the reply of the Western representatives, and not only we, but all peoples, and so, of course, are the peoples of their own countries, who in the event of a nuclear war would be the first victims.

Naturally, the Soviet delegation is ready to listen to and consider with the greatest attention and good will any observations, wishes, amendments and additions to our draft non-aggression pact and to answer any questions relating to it. We anticipate with interest a constructive and practical discussion of both the important questions submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the Soviet Union, and we express the hope that this discussion will end in the adoption of the Soviet proposals — the Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The implementation of these measures would be greeted with the greatest satisfaction throughout the world and would displease only a small group of warmongers and dealers in arms.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): In accordance with the recommendation of the co-Chairmen (ENDC/PV.108, p.34) adopted last week, we are today discussing collateral measures, and I hope that the discussions on those measures in our plenary meetings will proceed in as orderly a manner as possible and that we can now get to grips with some of the subjects, consideration of which has been delayed for too long. I say "In as orderly a manner as possible" because when one is discussing a number of separate issues it is rather difficult to get a coherent thread in the debate.

This morning I have listened with interest to the statements by you Mr. Chairman, and by our United States and Soviet colleagues, and not unnaturally, for the reason I have just given, a number of different subjects have now been put before the Committee. I should like to come back during my remarks to some of the things that our Soviet colleague has said to us this morning, but perhaps I might start by saying a little about the proposals for measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. I think that those of us who returned to Geneva from New York last autumn for our pre-Christmas session felt that the vital importance of reaching early agreement on measures to reduce the risk of war was generally recognized among us.

So far as my own and other Western delegations were concerned, we made no secret of the fact that we were willing and anxious to negotiate such an agreement. That of course is still the position. In the speech I had the opportunity of making to the First Committee in New York on 8 November last, I pointed out that:

"The events of recent days" — and there of course I was referring to the Caribbean crisis — "have ... shown us the important need of pushing on ahead at Geneva to reach agreement on special or collateral measures aimed at reducing international tension, building up confidence amongst States and thus making easier our work on the wider frame of general and complete disarmament." (A/C.1/PV.1269, p.21).

I suggested to the First Committee at that time that:

"... the most urgent one — in the light of recent developments — is to agree on what measures might be taken to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding and the misinformation on either side about the military dispositions of the other." (ibid. p.38)

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The type of measures that I had in mind, some of which are already to be found in both the United States and the Soviet plans, included:

"... the advance notification of military manoeuvres and movements, the exchange of military missions, direct communication between Heads of Governments, and the stationing of observers at major communications centres and air fields to report on concentrations and movements of military forces." (ibid.)

Now, all those measures are to be found in the United States working paper (ENDC/70) to which my United States colleague referred in some detail this morning. Moreover, the Committee will recall that, as I reminded the First Committee last autumn, the setting up of land control posts was in fact one of the measures for easing international tension proposed by Mr. Gromyko in the memorandum (A/4892) which he sent to the President of the General Assembly on 26 September 1961. The Committee will recall also that the establishment of observation posts at airfields was included in the original Soviet proposals (DC/71) against surprise attack put forward as long ago as 1955, and remained a part of Soviet proposals on surprise attack until 1958. From that it seems to me that there is a potential area of agreement in certain respects between the sides which this Committee could usefully explore. I therefore urge my Soviet colleague not to ignore this opportunity to work out here with us confidence-building measures in that field, and to do so now before the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I hope very much that our Soviet colleague will come forward soon with some constructive comments on the United States paper which, of course, his Government has now had some time to consider. My own view is that it is a helpful paper for the Conference to study and, I hope, to make progress on. Perhaps I might summarize the views of the United Kingdom delegation on the subject.

First, we consider that, broadly speaking, the measures described in the United States document would indeed help to reduce the risk of war. We therefore welcome and generally agree with those proposed measures and we hope to have some constructive and detailed suggestions to offer during our forthcoming discussions. I was interested this morning when our United States colleague suggested (Supra, p.19) the setting up of an informal technical working group or groups to explore the

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modalities of those arrangements. It may be in the recollection of my colleagues round this table that in the past I have more than once suggested the setting up of such groups in various connexions. I have all along believed that it could facilitate and speed our work — and, for heaven's sake, it needs speeding. It would really help to make progress in those fields without in any way detracting from the opportunities, at any rate for certain representatives, to indulge in very long propaganda speeches such as that which we endured just now.

Second, we consider that agreement or agreements on collateral measures, which do not, of course, involve any destruction of weapons, would nevertheless help to reduce international tension and build up confidence among States. If we could achieve such agreements — as I sincerely hope we shall — and if they could be put into effect in advance of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, then we should have every reason for hoping that our task in negotiating such a treaty would thereby be facilitated.

I recall that our Soviet colleague said something this morning about methods of direct consultation between governments (Supra, p.33), and that is certainly one of the matters with which the United States paper deals. I hope that there is an opportunity there to find a common purpose and to make progress.

I should like now to comment on the main theme of our Soviet colleague this morning, which appeared to be the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). He prefaced his statement by a great deal of comment about NATO, to which I shall return in a few moments, but it was the draft declaration, I understand, to which he was seeking to draw our attention. The United Kingdom delegation has now had time to study that document in more detail than had been possible when I gave my first reaction to it. It might therefore be helpful to the Committee if today I were to analyse it in some detail in order to bring out some of the implications to which, if I may say so, in spite of his speech this morning, Mr. Tsarapkin has certainly not done full justice.

First, however, I should like to remind the Committee briefly of the reasons why nuclear weapons came to be deployed in Western Europe. I think it is very necessary that I should do so in order to set the record straight.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

We should not make any pretence about the facts, and facts they are. As I pointed out at the meeting on 20 February:

"... NATO arose as a defensive alliance against Russian expansion at a time when the Western Powers had drastically reduced their armed forces from the levels of the last war but when the Soviet Union had at that same time maintained its forces at a very high level." (ENDC/PV.100, p.42)

The size of Russian forces coupled with Russian actions and statements during that period created grave instability and, I say seriously to this Committee, constituted a serious threat to peace at that time in a critical part of the world.

When I spoke in these terms before, Mr. Kuznetsov, who was then with us, took issue with me. He claimed that:

"NATO came into existence as a result of the aggressive policy of the Western Powers, a policy which recognized only force in dealing with contentious issues and considered that such issues could only be resolved by the use of force." (ibid., p.51)

I submit that Mr. Kuznetsov's reconstruction of post-war developments in Europe was, to say the least, distorted. Let me recall just one event during the post-war period which gave rise to considerable anxiety in Western Europe, and which showed only too clearly that, in this particular instance, it was not the Western Powers which adopted "a policy which recognized only force in dealing with contentious issues". I refer to the Soviet blockade of West Berlin. It began, as we all know, in June 1948 and lasted until May 1949. During that period it seemed all too likely that Western Europe was the next target for Russian expansion. It is necessary to recall those facts in the light of the speech to which we have just listened, for facts they are and they are incontrovertible. Was it surprising, then, that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 during that period of extreme tension? And was it surprising that the progressive deployment of nuclear weapons subsequently by NATO to ensure the threat of retaliation to any possible attack stabilized the situation and thus reduced the threat to peace? Our NATO alliance was entirely defensive. In its very creation it was defensive in character and was established solely to counter a massive Soviet threat. The power of the United States was combined with that of its smaller European allies, and that was the basis for the setting up of NATO. NATO is still an entirely defensive alliance.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In the course of his speech this morning our Soviet colleague indulged in a very considerable tirade against Western Germany. I submit he has given us a distorted, extravagant and untrue picture of Western Germany today. I reject that picture completely, and in passing I would comment that it always strikes me as strange that it is only the inhabitants of Western Germany who are so dangerous, while those unfortunate Germans still under Soviet control are peace-loving citizens, of course, in Soviet eyes. Our Soviet colleague said, if I noted his words correctly, that we were now witnessing a fatal repetition of the happenings of the past (supra. p.23). That is precisely what is not happening in this context. Probably the greatest factor in the emergence of Hitler to a position of dominance in the inter-war years was the attempt of the victors of 1918 to keep Germany ostracized. Modern Germany, I submit, is entitled to a place in the order of things, and Western Germany is a loyal member of the defensive NATO alliance. I hope, therefore, we shall not continue to have these charges which are so frequently being thrown about in this Committee.

I have given a little historical background, and if any justification for it were needed, then the speech which preceded mine gave ample justification. Until a sufficient measure of trust and confidence has been established between East and West, we must examine any proposal put forward here in the harsh light of reality. I should like to do that now by going through the Soviet draft declaration carefully. In doing so I think it is necessary to consider what would be involved for each side, what each side would gain and what each side would lose. I do this because the object of our negotiations in this Conference is surely to reach a mutually advantageous agreement by way of concessions on both sides. I think it is important for us to remember that. Too frequently we are asked to make concessions on the Western side. How does the Soviet draft declaration balance concessions between the two sides?

May I take, to begin with, the first operative paragraph, which asks the signatories

"To dismantle bases located in foreign territory for submarines carrying nuclear and rocket weapons and to renounce the use of foreign ports as bases for such submarines." (ENDC/75)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

What would that entail? We in the United Kingdom have at present a base in the Holy Loch in Scotland, which our Soviet colleague referred to this morning, and which is used by United States submarines. So far as I am aware, the Soviet Union now has no foreign bases for submarines, whether carrying nuclear and rocket weapons or not. In other words, the measures proposed in that paragraph would not affect the Soviet Union in any way at all. We in the West, on the other hand, would have to give up one most important base, and it is certainly not one being held against the wishes of the country on whose territory the base is. Thus, in the very first paragraph of the declaration, we have a clear example of imbalance: that is to say, its operative paragraph 1 amounts to a demand of a unilateral concession by the West and no concession by the Soviet Union.

While I am on the subject of submarines, perhaps I could just revert for a moment to the subject of the risk of war by miscalculation, about which I was talking earlier. One of the military factors which might contribute to such a miscalculation is the existence of vulnerable systems for delivering nuclear weapons. While there was nothing more advanced available, we in the West had to deploy delivery systems which were not ideal from that point of view. I am referring to delivery systems such as the Jupiters and the Thors. When those were first deployed in Europe we had no alternative means of countering the presence of very large Soviet forces poised on the borders of NATO member States. Since then the United States has developed a delivery system, Polaris, which because of its degree of invulnerability is much more appropriate to a defensive policy. That is a very important point -- the relevance between vulnerability and defence -- and I do ask my colleagues to study it.

The first opportunity is now being taken to replace the Jupiters and Thors by seaborne Polaris missiles, and the great value of that system stems from its invulnerability to surprise attack. I submit that it gives not only to the West but to the whole world two important advantages. First, it makes much less likely any miscalculation about the possible success of a surprise attack directed against the West; and if the calculation is that the attack is not worth while then the odds are that the attack does not take place. Second, it removes any necessity for

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

split-second reactions on the part of the West, and it does give the tremendous advantage of time for careful assessment of the situation in those periods of great stress which hold the real danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the more invulnerable a nuclear weapons delivery system is, the less risk there is of war arising through miscalculation. My Government has no doubt whatever that this Polaris delivery system is becoming, despite what our Soviet colleague may say here, a major factor in maintaining the peace, however uneasy a peace it is, which exists today. The replacement of Jupiters and Thors by Polaris is, in fact, a most substantial move in the direction of choosing a delivery system which makes war by accident, or war by miscalculation, far less likely. Of course, until we can succeed in our labours here for general and complete disarmament, which is our main task, I submit that this is a development of positive value, for the reasons I have given, in relation to the whole question of risk of war by miscalculation.

So, quite apart from the one-sidedness of operative paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft declaration, the Soviet proposal that we in Western Europe should no longer continue to defend ourselves as and where we see fit, using the best system at present available -- namely, the Polaris system, which of course, as everyone knows, is based on the Holy Loch base -- seems to us, in the light of the existing political situation and until such time as we achieve a treaty on general and complete disarmament, a retrograde step for our own security, and not only for our own security but for the safety of the world as a whole.

May I now go from paragraph 1 to paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft declaration, which asks the signatories --

"To withdraw from foreign ports aircraft carriers having on board aircraft armed with nuclear weapons." (ENDC/75)

The Committee is no doubt well aware that the Soviet Union in fact does not have aircraft carriers. Any restriction, therefore, on the deployment of those ships, and the aircraft they carry, once again amounts to a demand by the Soviet Union for a unilateral concession by the West with no -- I repeat, no -- balancing concession by the Soviet Union. Having looked at only two of its operative paragraphs, I submit

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

that the Soviet draft declaration begins to seem -- at least it does to me -- distinctly one-sided. I hope that our Soviet colleague will be able to agree with that assessment so far.

What is really happening here is that the Soviet Union is attempting, as I have said before, to exploit to the Western disadvantage a fact of geography. I refer of course to the fact that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies constitute one single, homogeneous geographical entity. The NATO alliance does not. Until the state of confidence between nations is such that we need no longer consider the balance of power between East and West, we must take account of such factors, and we must accept the consequences which flow from them.

Having said that, let me now turn to operative paragraphs 3 and 4. In our view, taken together with operative paragraphs 1 and 2, they are not only one-sided, they are positively dangerous. Why do I say that? Because they ask the signatories

"To dismantle strategical rocket installations located in foreign territory and to transfer to their own national territory rockets of 1,500 km range and over and the corresponding nuclear warheads." (ibid.)

They also ask the signatories --

"To withdraw strategical aircraft designed for delivering nuclear bombs to their targets as well as these nuclear bombs, from bases located in foreign territory to within their own national boundaries." (ibid.)

That is what those two paragraphs say.

I must emphasize again that we have to examine these proposals in the light of reality today. I speak, as is well known, as a representative of a European NATO Power. I should therefore like to study these proposals from the point of view of Europe.

At the meeting on 20 February I pointed out that the Soviet Union holds on its own territory sufficient medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles and medium range bombers to devastate Western Europe. I reminded the Committee that

"Those particular weapons are directed only at Western Europe for they do not have the range to reach the United States or any other part of the American continent." (ENDC/PV.100, p.43).

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I am speaking of those particular weapons and not of the very long range weapons to which our Soviet colleague paid such attention this morning. They are actual weapons which exist and which are pointed at Western Europe.

To give some background to that evaluation, I should like to quote some figures from a recently published booklet provided by the Institute for Strategic Studies, entitled The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances: The Military Balance 1962/1963. According to table II on page 26 of that document, the Soviet bloc possess some 700 medium range ballistic missiles, that is to say, missiles with a range of between 700 and 2,000 miles -- or roughly between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometres -- and armed with nuclear warheads. Page 3 of the booklet points out that:

"These are deployed in sufficient numbers to deal with strategic and semi-tactical targets -- such as fighter airfields -- in Western Europe, including Britain, and in the Far East."

The booklet goes on to say:

"It is likely that this build-up is continuing. It is clear that Soviet policy is to site them near the western, southern and eastern borders of the Soviet Union, on the Pacific coast and in Siberia."

That is the sort of reality which we in the West must take note of when considering the Soviet proposals. We must note that under the terms of the draft declaration not one Soviet missile of the immense armoury to which I have referred need be removed; not a single one. Since they fall below the 1,500 kilometre range specified in operative paragraph 3, the 700 mile missiles could, if the Soviet Government so desired, be placed on the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries to threaten all of Western Europe. On the other hand, the 2,000 mile missiles can threaten the whole of Europe from the Soviet homeland, and they of course would not be subject to the provisions of operative paragraph 3. But such missiles are no less of a threat to us in Western Europe because of that fact. That was the point that I was trying to make at the meeting on 20 February when I said:

"This ... is not a matter of foreign bases alone, if a domestic base in the Soviet Union can threaten Britain in exactly the same way as he" -- Mr. Kuznetsov" -- claims the Holy Loch base threatens the Soviet Union."

(ENDC/PV.100, p.43)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

With the permission of the Chairman, I should like for a few moments to dwell on the question of home and so-called foreign bases because, at the meeting to which I have referred, the Soviet representative tried to distort the remarks which I made and which I have just quoted. Mr. Kuznetsov alleged at that time that I saw "no difference .. between foreign military bases and national armed forces" (ibid., p.52). Well, it all depends on what Mr. Kuznetsov meant by "national armed forces". If he meant, among other things, bases in Western Russia with missiles armed with nuclear warheads and aimed at targets in my country and elsewhere in Western Europe, then it is certainly true that in that respect I do see no difference. If there is a difference, I should be very happy if Mr. Tsarapkin were to follow up Mr. Kuznetsov's kind offer to explain it to us. But I do hope that he will not try to convince me that I shall feel much less dead if I am hit by a nuclear missile which comes from his home territory and not from a foreign base. I hope also that he will remember that nuclear missile bases in NATO countries have been set up openly by binding international agreements freely entered into by the countries concerned. Those countries felt that such bases were essential for their defence and security and I do not therefore think that the Soviet delegation here is entitled to object. I hope the Soviet delegation will study the reasons why those bases were set up and then help us to dismantle all bases everywhere. I hope that Mr. Tsarepkin will reassure us that no one is threatening the security of NATO Member States. But I did note that while Mr. Kuznetsov emphasized at that meeting that "no one is threatening the United States" (ibid., p.52), he failed to mention that no one is threatening Western Europe. I trust that that omission was purely accidental, but he will understand my concern.

In general, what the Soviet draft declaration boils down to is this: the Soviet Union asks us to refrain from defending ourselves by deploying weapons which, unfortunately, are necessary for our defence, while itself making no corresponding move towards reducing the obvious threat to Europe which our weapons are designed to counter. Such a proposal, I submit, is one-sided. It is so unrealistic that I wonder why it was put forward; and also it is dangerous, because if it were to be implemented its implementation could lead in time to temptation to military action

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

in Europe. It would be such a situation, and not the present state of mutual deterrence that would be the greatest threat to world peace. Indeed, the consequences of the potential instability which would arise after the implementation of the draft declaration could be disastrous for the Soviet Union as well as for Europe, for the United States and, indeed, for the whole world.

May I remind my Soviet colleague in that connexion of a Russian proverb which in English runs as follows -- I hope I have it right, but no doubt he can correct me if I have not -- "Make yourself into a sheep and you will meet a wolf nearby." We do not propose to make ourselves into sheep unless and until -- and I hope this will be so -- we and our Soviet colleagues can become sheep together. In that connexion, our Soviet colleague talked a lot about NATO militaristic developments, but I hope he also reads what his own colleagues say back in Moscow, because I see that Marshall Koniev, in an interview with TASS on 19 February, is quoted as saying that:

"The Soviet armed forces have been reorganized, strategic rocket forces have been set up and are constantly being strengthened. These forces are provided with the most powerful missiles, which have ruled out the concept of a geographical invulnerability of an enemy for ever from military theory. The USSR firmly holds the lead in rocketry and space exploration; nuclear weapons are being improved."

That being so, I hope that he feels secure and that we can therefore set about reducing our weapons rather than blaming one another for the present state of affairs.

The Soviet proposals seek in fact to make propaganda capital out of the geographical fact that the Russian bloc consists of one large land mass and the NATO alliance consists of widely spread parts held together only by our sea and air communications. They seek also to conceal the fact that at this very moment hundreds of medium range missiles are pointing at us in Europe from Soviet territory and that not one of them would be affected by the proposals in any way whatsoever. That is a clear attempt to capitalize on the facts of geography.

We in the West are just as anxious as the Soviet Union and its allies to remove the threat and possibility of nuclear war in the world. We propose to do so by orderly, balanced and progressive schemes of disarmament. But we must be realistic.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

We would not advance our common aim by agreeing to this Soviet draft declaration -- if anything, we should increase the dangers and the risks by undertaking measures which could lead only to an imbalance of forces and to all the dangers which flow from that.

In conclusion, it seems to me that if we are to make progress in this Committee, we really must refrain from putting forward measures calculated to give all the advantage to one side and none to the other, measures which upset radically the present balance of power. Concessions have to be made on both sides if they are to lead to agreement. We would have a better chance of progress if we were to concentrate on measures of mutual benefit, in connexion with which there seems to me to be a potential area of agreement between both sides, and on which, I still firmly believe, agreement can, with good will, be reached. I hope we shall devote our thoughts and efforts more to that sort of thing than to making charges against one another. What I want to do is to get down to serious negotiation. I do submit that in this field of collateral measures there are a number in respect of which we can do that. I hope that the proposal put forward by our United States colleague this morning will be considered carefully. I am perfectly willing to look at other measures but I have spent more time on this particular one this morning because I thought it important that my colleagues around this table should realize its one-sided nature and therefore the reason why we could not possibly accept it.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fifteenth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Macovescu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 1 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

